Child-raising pension benefits in Germany are designed as a compensation for maternal employment interruptions due to child-birth. In comparison to most other family benefits, child-raising pension benefits are accumulated upon child birth but become effective only on the verge of retirement. Hence, the extent to which child-raising pension benefits are determinants of the maternal employment decision depends essentially on a mother's individual discount factor and her planning horizon. This paper tests the hypothesis that child-raising pension benefits influence the maternal employment decision. Exploiting the pension reform 1992 as a natural experiment, a regression-discontinuity method is used.
Introduction
Women having a child generally experience an at least temporary reduction in earnings due to employment interruptions following childbirth. When mothers return to the labor market they show a higher tendency to work part-time compared to childless women (Boll, 2010) . The German child-raising pension benefit 1 is designed as a compensation for pension contributions due to maternal employment interruptions following child-birth. This paper tests whether mothers adjust their employment behavior as a response to the provision of child-raising pension benefits. By exploiting the expansion of these pension benefits in 1992 as a natural experiment, short-and medium-run employment effects are estimated based on a regression discontinuity identification strategy.
In Germany, pension entitlements are based on the sum of individual pension contributions that were accumulated over the life course. Therefore, any employment interruption naturally reduces a mother's compulsory pension contributions from employment. Lower pension contributions paid over the life course translate into lower pension entitlements. Consequently mothers generally face a higher risk of old-age poverty at retirement. In order to compensate mothers for this child-birth induced employment interruption, a new family pension benefit was introduced in 1986. Since then periods of child-raising have been taken into account by the German statutory pension fund (GRV) in the calculation of a mother's individual pension entitlements.
Generally, child-raising pension benefits can be interpreted as artificial pension contributions granted to mothers.
In contrast to most other family benefits and transfers, these pension benefits only become effective many years after being accrued. In particular, family benefits are usually granted from birth of a child, while child-raising pension benefits only become effective on the verge of retirement. This inter-temporal nature has to be considered when investigating the impact of the child-raising pension benefit on maternal employment. While a perfectly rational forward-looking mother is presumed to behaviorally 1 In the following "child-raising pension benefit" refers to the family pension benefit called Kindererziehungszeiten. In general there are various pension benefits in the GRV targeting at families. For further details see Schmähl, Rothgang, and Viebrok (2006) . The institutional details of the childraising pension benefit will be explained in the next section.
respond to child-raising pension benefits, her myopic counterpart is less likely to change her employment behavior. Assuming that a mother strongly responds to the provision of child-raising pension benefits by reducing her employment level, she eventually faces negative long-term effects on her earnings potential. It is well known that career interruptions generally lower the individual earnings potential through human capital depreciation and lower work experience (Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Beblo and Wolf, 2002; Beblo, Bender, and Wolf, 2009) . Hence, in the evaluation of child-raising pension benefits, it is crucial to take into account also potential employment reactions. This paper contributes to the literature by estimating short-and medium run employment effects of child-raising pension benefits. Since short-and medium run employment responses pave the way for the individual long-term earnings potential, knowledge about them is particularly interesting (Shapiro and Mott, 1994) .
As mentioned before, child-raising pension benefits differ from most other family benefits with respect to its time dimension. A well-known example of a family benefit that is provided to families upon child birth is the child allowance (Kindergeld ).
2 The child allowance is generally granted to parents until a child turns 18. Its impact on maternal employment was evaluated in a recent study : Rainer, Bauernschuster, Danzer, Hener, Holzner, and Reinkowski (2012) exploit a large increase of the child allowance in 1996 to identify its impact on maternal labor supply. They find that the child allowance tends to reduce maternal employment, particularly among mothers with low earnings potentials. While these findings provide empirical evidence that mothers generally consider family benefits in the their employment decision, we cannot directly infer that mothers would also change their employment behavior as a response to the provision of child-raising pension benefits.
As mentioned above, in order to estimate maternal employment responses to childraising pension benefits, the expansion of these pension benefits in 1992 can be exploited as a natural experiment (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000) . The pension reform in 1992 increased the duration of child-raising pension benefits from one to three years for all newborns from January 1992. However, in 1992 not only the pension reform became effective but also an expansion of parental leave, affecting mothers in the same discontinuous way, was implemented. The impact of this parental leave expansion on maternal employment was studied by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2011) . They find that the expansion of the parental leave period from 18 to 36 months reduces the employment probability by 10.2 (6.1) percentage points 19 (28) months after child birth. Their study does not find long-term employment responses. In order to disentangle the effects from both, the parental leave and the pension reform, this paper only focuses on mothers who were not employed prior to giving birth to a child. Hence, those mothers
were not affected by the extended job-protection period but only by the longer duration of child-raising pension benefits. By comparing mothers who had their child shortly before the turn of the year 1991/92 -being subject to the old child-raising pension benefit regulation -to women who gave birth to a child shortly after the turn of the year 1991/92 -benefiting from the extended benefit duration -the causal effect of the child-raising pension benefit on maternal employment can be identified. The empirical analysis is based on the administrative BASiD 3 data set. It provides the entire employment biography of individuals covered by the GRV.
So far there are barely any empirical studies analyzing the effects of the extension of child-raising pension benefit in 1992 on mothers. The only empirical study I know is the one by Frommert and Thiede (2012) . They provide a first attempt of analyzing the implications of the extension of child-raising pension benefits on old-age income of mothers. Their descriptive analysis shows that mothers who gave birth to at least one child after December 1991 tend to have a higher old-age income compared to mothers who gave birth to children before that date. However, the authors mention that systematic differences exist between their comparison groups that might at least partly explain the difference in projected old-age income.
The results of the paper can be summarized as follows: Child-raising pension benefits do not seem to play a role in a mother's decision on post child-birth employment. Neither employment responses in the short-nor in the medium run could be identified.
Consequently, since mothers do not tend to adjust their labor supply as a response to child-raising pension benefits, these benefits can be regarded as a valid measure to re-3 Biographical data of selected insurance agencies in Germany.
duce the risk of old-age poverty among mothers with respect to employment responses.
The paper is structured as following: The subsequent section introduces the institutional background of the pension reform. Then the economic incentives, implied by the pension reform, are explained in detail. In section 3, the identification strategy is presented. Next, the data set is described and the empirical results are discussed. The final section concludes.
2 Institutional background
Child-raising pension benefits
This section describes the accumulation of pension entitlements in Germany and further introduces the institutional setting of child-raising pension benefits in the GRV.
The German public pension scheme principally links the amount of pension payments to the value of a pensioner's accumulated pension contributions over her working life. Next, this paragraph describes the role and development of child-raising pension benefits in the German public pension scheme. Child-raising pension benefits can essentially be interpreted as artificial pension contributions in periods, a mother spends on childraising. They were introduced in 1986: From 1986, 0.75 earnings points were granted to a mother in her first year after child birth. 5 Hence, her future pension entitlements increased by the amount corresponding to 0.75 earnings points. By introducing the child-raising pension benefit, the policy maker wanted to compensate young mothers for employment interruptions due to child-raising periods, in which no or lower pension contributions were accrued. However, the generosity of these benefits was conditioned on the employment status of a mother in the first year after childbirth. Pension contributions stemming from child-raising periods were withdrawn at a one-to-one rate against compulsory contributions from employment. Therefore, only mothers who either did not enter employment or who earned less than 75% of the average income (corresponding to 0.75 earnings points) gained from the new benefit.
The pension reform in 1992 increased the child-raising pension benefit substantially:
The provision period was extended from one to three years, however only for newborns from January 1992. For all births before that date only one year of child-raising pension benefit was granted. Consequently for subsequent births the maximum benefitexpressed in earnings points -rose from 0.75 to 2.25 (3 years x 0.75 earnings points).
Translated into pecuniary terms, the longer duration of the child-raising pension bene-5 The benefit was only granted to mothers born after 1921.
fit in the GRV resulted in a maximum increase of pension entitlements by 1.5 additional earnings points. Expressed in values of 2012 the maximum gain of 1.5 earnings points refers to e 42.10 per month upon retirement til death. For a reference mother, aged 30 years in 1992, the maximum gain from this pension reform amounts to a present discounted value in 1992 of e 2640 (expressed in 2012 values). It is assumed that she retires at the age of 65 while having the average life expectancy of 83 years, based on a discount rate of 3% (details are provided in the appendix). However, earnings points from child-raising pension benefits were offset against earnings points originating from compulsory contributions from employment. Hence, a mother whose child was born in January 1992 would gain 1.5 earnings points from the benefit extension if not being employed in the three years following child birth. In contrast, if the same mother would return to full-time employment 6 12 months after child birth, then she would not benefit from the extension of child-raising pension benefits since her earnings points from the pension benefit would be offset against those from employment.
Since subsequent reforms changed the incentives for all mothers, regardless of a child's date of birth, this study focuses only on the pension reform in 1992. It would be problematic to attribute employment effects to the 1992 pension reform if also considering the time period from 1999, when the next change of child-raising pension benefits was implemented. Hence, this analysis is restricted to short-and medium-run employment effects implied by the child-raising benefits expansion in 1992. Nevertheless, the two subsequent amendments are briefly described. The first change in 1999 increased the generosity of the child-raising pension benefit regardless of a child's birth date from 0.75 to one earnings point. In addition, compulsory contributions stemming from employment were only offset against earnings points from child-raising pension benefits if adding up to a higher value than pension contributions based on the contribution ceiling. The higher generosity as well as the additivity were introduced retrospectively for all mothers born after 1921. The second amendment (Altersvermögenergänzungsgesetz 
Economic incentives
This section discusses the economic incentives implied by the child-raising pension benefit and its extension in 1992. As mentioned above, the character of child-raising pension benefits in the GRV differs substantially from many other benefits and transfer such as the child allowance (Kindergeld ) with respect to the time dimension. While most child-related benefits and transfers are paid from the date a child is born, childraising pension benefits first become effective on the verge of retirement, many years after a child's birth. Hence, the individual decision-making time horizon plays an important role for economic incentives implied by child-raising pension benefits. While mothers facing a high discount rate or a short decision-making horizon are less prone to react to the benefit provision, perfectly rational mothers would fully incorporate the future implications of the benefit that is granted today.
In principle, the extension of child-raising pension benefits from one to three years in 1992 lowered the incentives for mothers to (re-)enter the labor market during the three years following child birth. Since pension contributions are accumulated through child-raising pension benefits, no compulsory pension contributions -resulting from employment -had to be made. Assuming that a mother only considers the impact of being employed on her future pension entitlements, then she has no incentive to (re-)enter the labor market in year two or three after child birth if her earnings would be lower than 75% 7 of average earnings and if her child was born after December 1991 in comparison to a mother who gave birth to a child before January 1992. In fact, working mothers were penalized by the fact that pension contributions from employment were withdrawn against contributions due to child-raising pension benefits at an one-to-one basis. 8 Hence the intensity by which mothers -who had a child after 1991 -were affected by the child-raising pension benefit extension varied by their employment status in the three years following child birth. Only those mothers who did not (re-)enter employment in that period could fully take advantage of the benefit extension.
7 100% after the pension reform in 1999 was implemented. 8 This penalty was abolished in 1999. However, since we only consider the time period before 1999 in this analysis, it is still relevant.
Identification
The fundamental challenge in any policy evaluation is the choice of an appropriate comparison group. The control group delivers the information on how individuals would have behaved in absence of a policy change. This study exploits the design of the pension reform 1992 in constructing a treatment-and a control group: While all mothers who had a child from January 1992 (treatment group) gained from the extension of the child-raising pension benefit from one to three years, woman giving birth to a child just before that date (control group) did not benefit and still received the child-raising pension benefit for just a year. Comparing the treatment-to the control group identifies the impact of the child-raising pension benefit extension on maternal employment.
This regression discontinuity design relies on the assumption that treatment-and control group are not systematically different and thus are comparable. In comparison with other "typical natural experiment strategies" (e.g. differences-in-differences or instrumental variables), the literature argues that the regression discontinuity design requires rather mild assumptions and isolates "treatment variation that is as good as randomized" (Lee and Lemieux, 2010, p. 282) .
In recent years, economists increasingly adopted the regression discontinuity design to a broad range of economic problems. Angrist and Lavy (1999) e.g. applies the identification strategy in estimating the impact of class size on student test scores in Isreal. Oreopoulos (2006) estimates the returns to education by exploiting the design of a compulsory schooling law in the UK. In the German context, Geyer, Haan, and Wrohlich (2014) estimate the impact of the parental leave reform 2007 on maternal employment using a regression discontinuity strategy. The paper by Lee and Lemieux (2010) gives an excellent overview of the application of the regression discontinuity design in economics.
The crucial prerequisite for assigning mothers into treatment or control group, conditional on their baby's birth date, is the fact that other pension reforms were dependent on a mother's year of birth and not on the child's month of birth. Therefore, other pension reforms would have affected all mothers in the treatment and in the control group at the same time.
As mentioned above, in order to disentangle the impact of the expansion of child-raising pension benefits from the simultaneous parental leave reform in 1992, only mothers who were not employed in the 3 months prior to giving birth to a child are considered in this analysis. Those mothers simply had no employment they could return to after taking parental leave. Hence, this group of mothers was only affected by the extension of child-raising pension benefits. About two thirds of all corresponding mothers were not employed in the 3 months prior to giving birth to their last child.
Comparing mothers who had a child close 9 to the cut off date (1/1/1992), the only institutional discontinuity between the control and the treatment group is the different duration of child-raising pension benefits. In short, the treatment group consists of mothers who had their last child in the first quarter 1992, while the control group consists of those mothers who had their last child in the fourth quarter 1991. Only mothers who gave birth to their last child are considered since subsequent births naturally would have lowered a mother's propensity to (re-)enter employment. The econometric model can be expressed in the following way (probit specification):
where i indicates a mother and the subscript t represents the age of a child. The model is estimated separately for three different values of t: At the child age of 19, 28
and 36 months. By estimating the model based on child age, we can make sure that e.g. at month ten all mothers had been entitled to the child-raising pension benefit for ten months, regardless whether they gave birth to a child e.g. in October 1991 or in February 1992. Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The dependent variable employed it equals to one if a mother i is employed in t, zero otherwise. post it equals to one if a mother i gave birth to her child after December 1991, i.e. being in the treatment group, and zero else. β 1 is the coefficient of interest as the implied marginal effect shows the impact of the child-raising pension benefit extension on maternal employment. X it is a vector of control variables: age it ,age 2 it , education it , region it , number of children it and German it . Finally, e it captures the error term.
9 In the baseline specification "close to the cut-off date" refers to having a child in the last quarter 1991 vs. the first quarter 1992. As a robustness check, however, I expand the the bandwidth to ± two quarters. In the following, it will only be referred to the first specification of treatment and control group (± one quarter around the turn of the year 1991/92).
There are two main threats that could potentially invalidate this identification strategy. First, if parents could self-select themselves into the treatment group by strategically controlling the timing of their child's date of birth and secondly if mothers in treatment and control group differed systematically in unobservable factors that cannot be accounted for by the econometrician, this would impose a threat to the identification strategy.
First, the selection of mothers into treatment or control group depends on the child's date of birth. In principle mothers have an incentive to self-select themselves into the treatment group to benefit from the extended provision period of child-raising pension benefits. In the literature, there are several studies that document a strategic timing of birth behavior among parents for different policy changes (Neugart and Ohlsson, 2013; Gans and Leigh, 2009; Tamm, 2012) . In this context, a mother preferred giving birth to a child in December 1991 instead of January 1992. Nevertheless, a child's birth date can only partially be controlled by parents. Ekberg, Eriksson, and Friebel (2005) emphasize that birth, as such, is a "random event", since parents cannot completely control the timing of conception. Further, the duration of pregnancy follows a normal distribution of 40 weeks and a standard deviation of two weeks (Ekberg, Eriksson, and Friebel, 2005, p. 9) . However, it might still be possible that particularly around the cut-off date (1/1/1992) births have been postponed. In order to address that concern, (Dustmann and Schönberg, 2008, appendix A) analyze the timing of births around the turn of the year 1991/92. They find no evidence that there has been a strategic timing of births around the turn of the year 1991/92. Second, since unobservable factors are not observable by definition, we can solely investigate if observable characteristics are equally distributed across both groups. This is the standard test in empirical work to check for random assignment of individuals into treatment and control group (Lee and Lemieux, 2010, p. 296) . When comparing observable characteristics across treatment and control group, there is no substantial difference in the distribution of observables.
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In the baseline model, the treatment-and control group consist of woman giving birth to a child ± 3 months around the cut-off-date January 1, 1992. The underlying restriction of the bandwidth of the sample to three months prior and three months post the 10 The results are provided by table 4 in the appendix.
reform results from the fact that a larger bandwidth imposes a higher risk that unobservable factors -apart from the observable policy change -differ across both groups.
However, since it is well known that a higher sample size increases the efficiency of an estimator, the bandwidth of the sample is increased to a year -six months prior and six months post the reform -as a robustness check. Some authors argue that mothers potentially differ systematically with respect to their employment behavior depending on the season their child is born (Buckles and Hungerman, 2008) 
Data and Results
In this section, the data is introduced and descriptive evidence presented. Next, the empirical results are discussed.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on BASiD (Biographical Data of Social Insurance Agencies in Germany). It results from a linkage of two administrative data sources of the GRV and the Federal Employment Agency via the identical social security number that serves as a unique individual identifier (Hochfellner, Müller, and Wurdack, 2012 advantage of the administrative BASiD data is the provision of precise and detailed information on the individual employment history.
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of West-German mothers to avoid any bias that might result from the conversion of former GDR pension entitlements. In addition, only mothers that are coded as employees or laborers are considered. 12 Further, only validated pension accounts are used. 13 In order to disentangle the employment response, induced by the pension reform, from the impact of giving birth to subsequent children, a mother is only included in the sample if she had her last child in the corresponding time period. This results in a sample size of 422 mothers.
Descriptive evidence
Next, this section presents descriptive findings. Figure 1 depicts the employment status for different groups of mothers by the age of the last child, measured in months. It is plotted for different groups of mothers depending on whether they gave birth to a child in the last quarter 1991 vs. in the first quarter 1992 and by their employment status prior to giving birth to a child. The data confirms the presumption that mothers who were employed prior to giving birth to a child (A) have a stronger attachment to the labor market: Overall, they (re-)enter earlier into employment after child birth and reveal the highest employment rates regardless of child-age. When comparing only mothers of group A, those who had a child in the last quarter 1991 show a substantially higher employment propensity from month 18 to month 36 relative to mothers who had a child in the first quarter 1992. Since the latter group benefited from the parental leave expansion in 1992, this finding is not surprising. Further, these descriptive results are generally in line with the findings of the study by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2011) that estimates the impact of the parental leave reform on maternal employment. Hence, including mothers -being affected by the parental leave expansion in 1992 -in the empirical analysis would bias the estimates of the employment response to the pension reform. Consequently, only mothers who had not been employed prior to giving birth to a child are selected into the sample (group C). They had not been employed in the three months -preceding child birth -and therefore were not affected by the simultaneously 12 Since miners and crafts-persons have separate pension funds, they are excluded from the analysis.
13 Roughly 10% of all pension accounts in BASiD are not validated. introduced parental leave expansion in 1992. When investigating their employment behavior no systematic differences with respect to the child's date of birth can be detected -neither in the first 36 months nor later. This suggests that the child-raising pension benefit does not affect maternal employment.
Finally, when comparing observable characteristics across treatment and control group, there is no substantial difference in the distribution of observables.
14 Hence, based on these observables there is no empirical evidence against the identifying assumption of both groups being similar and thus comparable.
14 The results are provided by Table 4 in the Appendix. Table 2 presents the Probit and OLS results of the impact of the child-raising pension benefit reform ('Treatment') on the maternal employment status. The results are depicted for the sample of mothers who had their last child either in the last three months of 1991 or in the first quarter 1992. Further, only mothers are considered who had not been employed in the 3 months prior to giving birth to the last child.
Regression results
Focusing on the first row containing the estimated effect of being in the treatment group, it becomes evident that in none of the specifications regardless of child age, the employment behavior of mothers in the treatment group is statistically significant different from the one of the control group at the normal level of significance. Further, the point estimates in the different specifications -OLS and Probit -are almost identical for corresponding child ages.
A potential reason why no reform effects can be identified might be the sample size.
To address this concern, the model is re-estimated based on a larger sample (table 3) .
In this specification, mothers who had their child in the second half of 1991 are in the control group whereas mothers who had a child in the first half 1992 form the treatment group. While it is well known that a larger sample increases efficiency, comparing mothers who gave birth to their last child further away from the cut-off date of the policy change (1/1/1992) is less desirable. Those mothers are more likely to differ in more dimensions than just the different child-raising pension benefit regulation.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this robustness check, a range of two quarters around the cut-off-date seems acceptable.
The results based on this more broad definition of treatment-and control group are depicted by table 3. When looking at the first row that contains the estimates of the treatment variable, we see that mothers experiencing the child-raising pension benefit do not reveal systematically different employment patterns compared to the those being in the control group. In just one single specification (2), the employment status is weakly statistically significant lower in the treatment group. In comparison to the results based on the initial sample (table 2) the point estimates remain fairly stable while confidence intervals become slightly smaller due to the higher sample size. 
(8) Note: All specifications inclulde a constant term. All OLS estimations are based on robust standard errors. * Statistically significant at the 10%-level. The standard error is reported in brackets.
Data source: Biographical data of selected social insurance agencies in Germany (BASiD). 
(8) Note: All specifications inclulde a constant term. All OLS estimations are based on robust standard errors. ***/**/* Statistically significant at the 1%/5%/10%-level. The standard error is reported in brackets.
Data source: Biographical data of selected social insurance agencies in Germany (BASiD).
Another concern is a potential strategic timing of the child's date of birth. Mothers who are expected to give birth to a child just around the turn of the year 1991/92 could try to postpone the date of child birth just to the first week of January 1992 to benefit from the more generous family pension benefit. If mothers who would postpone the date of child-birth differed substantially with respect to their employment behavior from the remaining mothers, then estimates of the reform effect would be biased.
As mentioned before, (Dustmann and Schönberg, 2008 , appendix A) investigated the birth patterns around the turn of the year 1991/92 without detecting irregularities.
Nevertheless, one way to take into account a potentially strategic timing of births by mothers is to exclude all mothers who gave to birth to a child in December 1991 and January 1992 while estimating the model. However, when re-estimating the model under that restriction the general results do not change.
Next, the model that controls for potential seasonal differences among mothers depending on the child's date of birth is estimated. After controlling for seasonal differences, there is still no statistically significant employment pattern between treatment and control group. Moreover, the sign of the point estimate remains the same in all specifications.
So far, all samples were restricted to mothers who had not been employed in the three months prior to giving birth to their last child in order to isolate the impact of the child-raising pension benefit extension on maternal employment from the one, implied by the simultaneous parental leave expansion. The effect of the parental leave expansion in 1992 was studied by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2011) based on data from Social Security Records. In order to show that the results based on these two different data sets are comparable, a model similar to the one used by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2011) is estimated. In this exercise the treatment and control group are constructed accordingly: The sample includes all mothers regardless of whether they had been employed or not prior to giving birth to their last child. Now, mothers who had their last child around the turn of the year 1991/92 are compared to women who bore their last child around the turn of the year 1990/91. The results are documented by Table 6 in the appendix. Overall, the empirical results are similar to the study by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2011) : E.g. in month 19, mothers in the treatment group are about 9-10 percentage points less likely to be employed (Schönberg and Ludsteck (2011): -10.2 percentage points).
Summarizing, the empirical findings suggest that the extension of child-raising pension benefits in the GRV did not affect the maternal employment decision in the period in which these benefits are accrued.
Discussion and conclusion
The main purpose of child-raising pension benefits in the GRV is to compensate mothers for employment interruptions due to giving birth to a child. In order to evaluate whether this objective is met, it is essential to investigate if a mother actually considers the provision of child-raising pension benefits in the GRV in her employment decision.
If a mother considers the impact of being employed on her future pension entitlements in her employment decision, then child-raising pension benefits imply negative work incentives. If a mother strongly reduced her labor supply as a consequence of the provision of child-raising pension benefits she might eventually harm her long-term earnings potential through human capital depreciation or lower labor market experience. Hence this paper tests the hypothesis that a mother is less likely to be employed if she accrues child-raising pension benefits. In contrast to many other family benefits child-raising pension benefits are accrued upon child-birth, however they only become effective on the verge of retirement. Therefore, the extend to which a mother responds to such types of benefits depends crucially on her personal discount factor as well as on the degree to which she considers the impact of current actions on future states.
The identification strategy exploits the specific design of the pension reform 1992 that increased the duration of the child-raising pension benefit from one to three years for all births from January 1992. In the regression-discontinuity setting mothers who gave birth to their last child shortly before the policy change are compared to women who bore their last child shortly after the the child-raising pension benefit extension was implemented.
All empirical findings indicate that child-raising pension benefits do not play a significant role in a mother's employment decision. This is an important finding since it provides evidence that child-raising pension benefits can be regarded as a valid measure to lower the risk of old-age poverty among mothers with respect to employment responses in the period of benefit accrual. While this studies focused on short-and medium-term maternal employment responses to the provision of child-raising pension benefits, more dimensions for behavioral responses exist. Mothers could further e.g. adjust their savings decision or the date of retirement entry. However, these questions shall be addressed in future research projects. Treatment-and control group are defined as in the identification section.
Appendix
Calculation of the net present value of the maximum reform gain
The calculation of the maximum gain implied by the the extension of child-raising pension benefits in 1992 in terms of net present values is described for a reference mother:
• A mother is 30 years old when giving birth to her child.
• She retires at the age of 65.
• Her life expectancy amounts to 83 years.
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• The discount rate is set to 0.03.
• The annual gain in terms of 2012 values is EUR 42 * 12 = EUR 504. Note: All specifications inclulde a constant term. All OLS estimations are conducted using robust standard errors. ***/**/* Statistically significant at the 1%/5%/10%-level. The standard error is reported in brackets.
(8)
(10) 
